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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

have accorded if the risk had on the particular occasion been voluntarily assumed.
The Harter Act and bills of lading which permit assistance to
vessels in distress affect the shipper only in relation to his carrier.
They do not work a surrender to salved vessels of any right which
may arise against them by reason of the fact that damage to a
salving vessel's cargo turns out to have been the price of their safety.
FREDERICK GREEN.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SEPARATION

OF

POWERS-POWER

OF

CONGRESS TO REQUIRE JURY TRIAL IN CERTAIN CASES OF CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT.-[United States.] The case of Michaelson v. United
States,' decided by the Supreme Court on October 20, 1924, brings
over the constitutionality
to a satisfactory conclusion a controversy
2
of a provision of the Clayton Act which has divided professional
opinion for a decade. This Act (dealing with certain trade practices
in interstate commerce) is enforced, in part, by the issuance of
orders from certain federal courts, and further provides:
"Sec. 21. That any person who shall wilfully disobey [such lawful
orders],

. .

. if the act or thing so done by him be of such charac-

ter as to constitute also a criminal offense under any statute of the
United States, or under the laws of any State in which the act was
committed, shall be proceeded against for his said contempt as hereinafter provided.
"Sec. 22. .

. . In all cases within the purview of this Act such

trial may be by the court, or, upon the demand of the accused, by a
jury,.....
"Sec. 24. That nothing herein contained shall be construed to relate to contempts committed in the presence of the court, or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, nor to contempts
committed in disobedience of any lawful

. .

. order

.

.

. en-

tered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on
behalf of, the United States.

.

.

It having been held that this part of the Clayton Act applied
to cases arising under the federal anti-combination laws generally,

4
as well as to those specifically djealt with by the Act, certain striking

employees of a railroad in Wisconsin were proceeded against by bill
in equity for conspiring to interfere with interstate commerce by
certain tortious acts. For a violation of the injunction granted in this
case contempt proceedings were taken against Michaelson and others.
Their application for a jury trial was denied by the District Court,
and a judgment of guilty was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals (7th Circuit) on the ground of the unconstitutionality of
the jury trial provision. 5 On certiorari to the Supreme Court this
decision was reversed in the present case, it appearing that the acts
1. (1924) 45 S. Ct. 18.

2. (1914) 38 St. L. 730.
3. (1914) 38 St. L. 738-40.
4. Canoe Creek Coal Co. v. Christinon (1922) 281 Fed. 559; McGibboney v. Lancaster (1923) 286 Fed. 129.
5. Michaelson v. United States (1923) 291 Fed. 940.
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of which defendants were adjudged guilty were crimes under the
statutes of Wisconsin, 6 where they were committed.
The opinion of the court upon this point, by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, is brief and unanimous. Its grounds sufficiently appear
in the following quotations:
"But it is contended that the statute materially interferes with
the inherent powers of the courts and is therefore invalid. That the
power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been
many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice. The courts of the United
States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over
any subject, at once become possessed of the power. So far as the
inferior federal courts are concerned, however, it is not beyond the
authority of Congress ;7 but the attributes which inhere in that
power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor
rendered practically inoperative. That it may be regulated within
limits not precisely defined may not be doubted. The statute now
under review is of the latter character. It is of narrow scope,
dealing with the single class where the act or thing constituting the
contempt is also a crime in the ordinary sense. It does not interfere
with the power to deal summarily with contempts committed in the
presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, and is in express terms carefully limited to
the cases of contempt specifically defined. Neither do we think it
purports to reach cases of failure or refusal to comply with a decree
-that is, to do something which a decree commands-which may
be enforced by coercive means or remedied by purely compensatory
relief. If the reach of the statute had extended to the cases which
are excluded, a different and more serious question would arise.
But the simple question presented is whether Congress may require
a trial by jury upon the demand of the accused in an independent
proceeding at law for a criminal contempt which is also a crime.
In criminal contempts, as in criminal cases, the presumption of
innocence obtains. Proof of guilt must be beyond reasonable doubt
and the defendant may not be compelled to be a witness against
himself. 8 The fundamental characteristics of both are the same.
Contempts of the kind within the terms of the statute partake of
the nature of crimes in all essential particulars. 'So truly are they
crimes that it seems to be proved that in the early law they were
punished only by the usual criminal procedure, 9 and that at least in
England it seems that they still may be and preferably are tried in
10
that way.'
"The proceeding is not between the parties to the original suit,
but between the public and the defendant. The only substantial
difference between such a proceeding as we have here, and a crim6. Wis. R. S. 1921 sec. 4466c.
7. Ex parte Robinson (1873) 19 Wall. 505, 510-11; Bessette v. W. B.
Conkey Co. (1904) 194 U. S. 324, 326.
8. Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co. (1911) 221 U. S. 418, 444.

9. (1885) Transactions of Royal Historical Soc. (N. S.) 3:147.
10. Gompers v. United States (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 610-11.
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inal prosecution by indictment or information is that in the latter
the act complained of is the violation of a law, and in the former
the violation of a decree. In the case of the latter, the accused has
a constitutional right of trial by jury; while in the former he has
not. The statutory extension of this constitutional right to a class
of contempts which are properly described as 'criminal offenses'
does not, in our opinion, invade the powers of the courts as intended
by the Constitution or violate that instrument in any other way."'1
The good sense of all this is apparent, and has abundant justification in the records of English legal history. Until early in the
eighteenth century common-law contempts not committed in the
presence of the court or by court officials were punished in England
only after trial by jury,'2 and the propriety of doing otherwise was
perhaps not beyond doubt there until after the decision of Lord
Lyndhurst in Ex parte Van Sandau in 1844.13 The preferable practice in England even now is said to be to call a jury in such cases. 14
An undelivered opinion of Mr. justice Wilmot in King v. AlonW 5
(an unfinished political prosecution growing out of the Wilkes controversy of the mid-eighteenth century), first published in 1802, and
the authority of Blackstone who gave currency to Wilmot's then
unpublished views in his Commentaries' were chiefly responsible
for the growth of the present optional practice in England and the
more rigorous denial of juries altogether in criminal contempt cases
in America. There is, therefore, no sound reason why the legislature may not restore the older practice, at least in the narrow, closely
limited class of cases included in section 21 of the Clayton act, where
the acts done are crimes as well as contempts and thus well within
the general policy of using juries to find facts in criminal proceedings.
On logical as well as historical grounds the decision seems
sound. The theoretical basis for the American constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers is a dual one: (1) One department of government should be somewhat checked by the others to
lessen the danger of oppression present when widely varied powers
are exercised by a single hand; and (2) each department should be
protected in the exercise of its essential functions from the encroachments of the others. Obviously, reason (1) has no application to
the present case, nor can it be fairly said that reason (2) has more
than a colorable relation to it. The jury trial provision of the
Clayton Act falls far short of being a substantial interference with
11. (1924) 45 S. Ct. at p. 20.
12. Sir John Charles Fox "The King v. Almon" (1908) Law Quar. Rev.
24: at pp. 191 and 268-70. The first recorded instance was the case of one
Wilkes in 1720.
13. (1844) 1 Phillips 445, 454. See Fox "The King v. Almon" (1908)
Law Quar. Rev. 24: at p. 184; and "The Summary Process to Punish Contempt" (1909) Ibid. 25: at pp. 238-40.
14. See Gompers v. United States (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 611 and citations there given.
15. (1765) Wilmot "Opinions" 243.
16. Blackstone "Commentaries" (1769) IV: c. 20, sec. III, commented on
by Fox in (1909) Law Quar. Rev. 25: at pp. 247-48, and 253, n. (k).
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any of the powers necessary to the proper functioning of a court, if
this may be thought to be the judicial equivalent of the "power of
self-preservation" referred to by Chief Justice White in Marshall v.
Gordon'7 as the real basis of the "inherent" legislative power to
commit for contempt. See the comment on United States v. Gross-

man 8 in (1924)

ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

19:176.

For a valuable

series of essays by Sir John Charles Fox upon historical aspects of
the judicial power to punish contempts, with and without a jury,
see the note below.'9
JAMES PARKER HALL.
EVIDENCE-LEGSLATIVE POWER TO COMPEL TESTIMONIAL DiscOsuRm.-[Federal] In Ex parte Dougherty' we have a ruling on
the Senate's power to compel disclosure of documents from the
ordinary citizen, in aid of a resolution of inquiry. The ruling is
based on the following grounds: (1) Congress's power generally
to compel testimony is doubtful; (2) the power of the Senate or
the House alone to exercise such a general power; if it exists, is
doubtful; (3) either branch has the specific power to compel testimony in aid of impeachment proceeding at the proper stage, or of
an election contest, or of interrogation of federal officers personally,
by virtue of express constitutional clauses committing such subjects
to Congress; but the present demand for testimony did not fall
within any of these specific powers; (4) the present demand was
made upon a third person in an attempt virtually to try for crime
the then attorney-general, and was therefore an attempted exercise
of general judicial power, and was not authorized, because of propositions (1) and (2) above.
1. To dispose of this weighty subject in terms of "judicial
power" seems unsound. Such indeed was the theory in Kilbourn v.
Thompson,2 a case almost on all-fours, and the only controlling
precedent in the federal Supreme Court annals. And such is the
tempting, simple solution, viz., the legislative, judicial, and executive
powers being sharply separated in the Constitution, it follows that
Congress has no judicial power, unless by implication in a subject
specifically granted, and the proceeding to compel testimony is an
exercise of the judicial power.
2. The fallacy lies in the latter proposition. The compulsion
to give testimony is a detail of the judicial power,--but not of the

17.

(1917) 243 U. S. 521, 541-43.

18.

(1924 N. D. Ill. E. D.) ...

Fed.

19. These essays, under various titles, are published in (1908) Law
Quar. Rev. 24: 184, 266; (1909) Ibid. 25: 238, 354; (1920) Ibid. 36: 394;
(1921) Ibid. 37: 191; (1922) Ibid. 38: 185; (1924) Ibid. 40: 43. Some of
them are cited above in this case-note. Their content, in part, is digested
and commented upon by Professor Felix Frankfurter in an article on "The
Power of Congress over Criminal Contempts in Inferior Federal Courts"
(1924) Harv. L. Rev. 37: at 1042-52, to which the writer acknowledges
indebtedness.
1. 299 Fed. 620 (May 31, 1924, D. C. S. D. Ohio).
2. 103 U. S. 168.

